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1
Private parties and WTO Dispute Settlement System
Who bears the costs of non-compliance and why private parties should not bear them
Alberto ALEMANNO∗
“The duty to keep a contract … means a prediction that 
you must pay damages if you do not keep it-and nothing else”
 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The path of the law, 10 HARVARD L. R. 457 (1897) 
1. Introduction
The WTO system, by providing rules addressed to both States and private parties, represents the 
most sophisticated legal framework ever conceived to govern global trade1. Unlike many other 
international organizations, the WTO has a dispute settlement system characterized by compulsory 
jurisdiction, strict time frame, automatic decision-making process2, and is based on a two-tier 
mechanism of panels of first instance and an Appellate Body (AB). As stated in the Understanding 
on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes (DSU), the new system, replacing the 
∗ LL.M. (College of Europe, Bruges); PhD candidate in International Economic Law (Bocconi University, Milan); 
LL.M. candidate (Harvard Law School, Cambridge); J.D. (Università di Torino). The author would like to thank 
Andrew Guzman, John Morijn and Désirée van Schagen for their help in the writing of this paper. This paper was 
presented in the occasion of the 1st Cornell LLM Association Conference held at Cornell Law School, Myron Taylor 
Hall, on April 4, 2004. 
1 The WTO, established on 1 January 1995, is subsumed and expanded upon the GATT, an international agreement that 
had regulated international trade since 1947.
2 The adoption of panel by the DSB cannot longer be blocked by the losing party as it was the case under the GATT
system. A refusal of the report is possible only within 30 days of circulation by consensus (thus including also the 
highly improbable vote of the winning party). See, Articles 16.4  and 17.14 DSU.
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old and less rule-oriented GATT settlement mechanism, is a “central element in providing security 
and predictability to the multilateral trading system”3.
However, despite the progressive judicialization of the dispute procedure4, private parties have 
no direct access to any of the WTO Geneva-based bodies to complain about government practices 
that allegedly infringe on a WTO agreement5, nor can they rely on rights granted by WTO law 
before domestic courts, as they lack of direct effect6.
3 Article 3.2 DSU.
4 On the evolution of the dispute settlement from a “power-oriented” to a more “rule-oriented” mechanism, see William 
J. Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement: Segregating the Useful Political Aspects and Avoiding “Over-Legalization”, in
MARCO BRONCKERS & REINHARD QUICK (eds.), NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, Essays in 
Honor of John Jackson 291 (Kluwer Law International: The Hagues, London, Boston, 2000); the most significant 
element brought by the reform is the introduction of the so called “automaticity principle” according to which the
formation of panels, adoption of reports and retaliation - if a DSB’s ruling is not complied with - are all automatic.
5 However, in the event of a Member violating WTO rules, private companies can petition their governments to have 
recourse to the dispute settlement system to challenge the legality of their measures with the WTO agreements. Both the 
US and the EC have created trade remedy mechanisms that allow private parties to complain about illegal practices of 
third countries and to request their trade authorities (US Trade Department; the EC Commission), to intervene before 
the WTO. As for the US trade mechanism, see Fred L. Morrison & Robert Hudec, Judicial protection of Individual 
Trade Rights in the US, in MEINHARD HILF & ENRST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 130 (Kluwer ed., 1993); as for the EC, see Marco Bronckers & Natalie McNelis, The 
EU Trade Barriers Regulation Comes of Age”, 35 J. WORLD TRADE, 427 (2000). For a periodic updates on the 
operation of the Trade Barriers Regulation in the EU, see http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/policy/traderegul/ 
index_en.htm.
6 In this paper, “direct effect” refers to the possibility of a private person in a WTO Member to base a claim in 
domestic courts against another private party, or another Member State, relying on an alleged violation of a WTO rule. 
The literature on the issue of direct effect of WTO rules is extensive and the problem is yet unresolved. For our 
purpose, it is sufficient to remind that, as a result of the Uruguay Round, both the EC and the US excluded the 
invocation of any rule of the WTO before national courts as a matter of statutory law. See respectively, Decision 
94/800 of 22 December 1994, OJ 1994 L336/1 and 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement Act, 19 USCS §3511, Pub. L. 
No. 104-305 (1996), §102(c).  Several reasons explain why private parties are not allowed direct access to the dispute 
settlement system, among which: the majority of the Members do not want the organization to lose its 
intergovernmental nature; Member want to maintain their monopoly in deciding which cases to bring before the DSB; 
lack of adequate structure and resources. In short, recognizing direct effect to private parties would inevitably hamper 
the WTO Members’ attempts to defend the national interest by eliminating the flexibility underpinning the whole 
multilateral trade system. For a canonical overview on direct effect in international law generally, see John H. Jackson, 
Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 310, (1992). More specifically on 
direct effect of WTO rules, see ex multis Jacques Bourgeois, The European Court of Justice and the WTO, in GRAINNE 
DE BURCA & JOANNE SCOTT, THE EU, THE WTO AND THE NAFTA, TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE 71, at 115 (Hart publishing ed., 2000); Thomas  Cottier, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: 
Characteristics and Structural Implications for the European Union, 35 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 325 (1998) and 
Francis Snyder, The Gatekeepers: The European Courts and WTO Law,  40 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 365 (2003). 
Among the voices contra the recognition of direct effect of both WTO and DSB’s rulings see e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, 
Bananas, Direct Effect and Compliance, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 677 (1999) and Mark L. Movsesian, Enforcement of 
WTO Rulings: An Interest Group Analysis, (September 12, 2003) at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=444640 
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Having this in mind, quid iuris when a violation of a WTO agreement has been sanctioned by a 
panel and/or the Appellate Body? May private business operators invoke the DSB’s reports before 
the courts of the losing member? Are individuals entitled to recover compensation for damages 
suffered from the non-compliance? 
In this paper I will try to provide an answer to these questions, by addressing the neglected, 
though crucial, issue of the legal status of the WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions in national and 
regional law.
The question is not merely academic: despite the fact it only arises in pathological situations of 
non-compliance, this issue is extremely relevant for those private companies who might be affected 
by the non-implementation of DSB’s rulings addressed to countries where they do business. To 
some extent the question of the legal status of panel and AB reports measures the effectiveness of 
the new dispute settlement system in promoting security and predictability for all the actors, notably 
for private companies.
On the one hand, the DSU provides for an obligation to comply with the ruling. On the other, its 
text offers a range of ways and means of provisional implementation aimed at putting economic and 
political pressure on Members to withdraw or amend the WTO-illegal measures. According to these 
rules, instead of complying with the report the losing party may offer to compensate, when 
immediate withdrawal of the measure is “impracticable”. Should this party fail to agree with the 
winning party on a “mutual acceptable compensation”, it can face retaliation under the form of 
surcharge tariffs7. As a matter of fact, these remedies do not result in the resumption of sales of the 
products or services in the Member maintaining inconsistent WTO measures, rather they tend to 
raise substantially the trade barriers amongst countries8. It follows that, whenever these alternative 
7 Artiche 22.1 and 22.2 DSU
8 In particular, doubts have been expresses as to the effectiveness of retaliation as a temporary remedy for breach of 
WTO law by several scholars, see e.g. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: 
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ways are taken, often as a “traditional option of realpolitik” by the governments9-, the costs of non-
compliance are mainly borne by those private companies directly affected by the WTO violation10. 
The current enforcement mechanism is traditionally depicted as a balanced system of powers 
whereby the WTO has sufficient power to promote global trade without becoming a threat to 
representative democracy. Retaliation aims at producing incentives for the exporting groups to 
lobby against protection measures while allowing the offending member to have the final say on its 
regulatory policy. 
However, retaliation, mainly relying on the unforeseable outcomes resulting from the activity of 
interest groups, may not always ensure compliance. Hence, WTO’s member non implementation 
with DSB’s rulings may hurt innocent firms that find their products barred from the market or 
subject to higher duties. 
This situation amounts to a real denial of justice: why should private companies bear the costs 
of strategic commercial decisions taken by WTO members without having a right to recover their 
damages? There exists an anomaly in a system of dispute settlement that ascertains the violation of 
WTO rules, but whose decisions cannot be invoked before courts by individuals affected by their 
non-implementation. Henceforth, there is a need to shift the costs of non-compliance with DSB’s 
reports from the private business operators to the responsible Members. 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 109-11 (Harvard University Press: Cambridge and 
London, 1998); Joost Pauweliyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules – Towards a More 
Collective Approach, 94 AM. INT’L L. 335, 338 (2000); Steven Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, AM. J. 
INT’L L., 792, 792-832 (2001) and Robin Nordblad, Enforcement of World Trade Organization Law, FINNISH 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (2002).
9 Cottier, supra note 6, at 364.
10 For this line of argument, see Edwini Kessie, Enhancing Security and Predictability for private Business Operators 
under the Dispute Settlement System of the WTO, 34(6) J. WORLD TRADE 1, 17 (2000) (stating that  “Altough private 
business operators do not have access to the DSS of the WTO, they are the ones who are most likely to be affected by 
the inefficiencies of the system” and Charnovitz, supra note 12, at 810-11 (arguing that WTO sanctions hurt “innocent 
ecomic actors” and violate the “basic human right” to “voluntary commercial intercourse”).
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Against this backdrop, the real challenge is to accommodate the private parties’ interests within 
the DSS without reducing the discretion that WTO Members enjoy in the implementation of the 
DSB’s reports11. 
To date, any WTO member’s court has recognized the ‘invokability’ of these reports, by 
regarding this issue as strictly related to the question of direct effect of WTO obligations. Lacking 
WTO rules of direct effect, the possibility to invoke DSB’s reports before courts is denied. Hence, 
private business operators cannot recover the damages suffered as a direct result of the non-
compliance with a DSB’s report12.
This paper argues that private business operators, currently bearing all the costs of non-
compliance, should be allowed to invoke the DSB’s reports before the courts of the losing Member 
in order to recover the damages suffered as a result of the non implementation with the DSB’s 
rulings. To this end, it will demonstrate that looking at the status of DSB’s reports exclusively 
through the lens of direct effect might be misleading. It will illustrate that the ‘invokability’ of a 
DSB’s report is a separate conceptual problem from the one of direct effect and how the arguments 
generally put forward to deny direct effect of WTO rules do not necessarily prevent the recognition 
of some status to the WTO dispute settlement decisions in domestic law13. To provide private 
parties the right to obtain the recovery of the damages suffered does not amount to the recognition 
11 A first step toward the opening of the DSS to private parties was made by the Appellate Body’s report in the 
Shrimps/Turtle case where for the first time the submission of amicus curiae briefs was accepted. See Appellate Body 
Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R.
12 The finger has really often been pointed at the EC as it still persists in non implementing the Hormones ruling. Report 
of the Appelate Body, EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS26 & 28 (hereinafter the 
“Hormones case). However, also the US is refusing to comply with several WTO rulings, such as the “Foreign Sales 
Corporation”, the “Homestyle exemption to copyright rules” and the “Havana club” ruling. See Report of the Appelate 
Body, US – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”, WT/DS108/ARB (Aug. 30, 2002) (hereinafter the “FSC 
case”) and Report of the Appellate Body – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriation Act of 1998 – WT/DS176/9 (hereinafter 
the “Havana Club case”).
13 In this line of thought see Thomas Cottier, The impact of the TRIPs Agreeement on private practice and litigation, in 
JAMES CAMERON & KAREN CAMPBELL (eds.), DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE WTO 126 (Cameron & May, 1998), who 
says that the “invokability” of DSB’s decision “is a matter entirely different from the issue of direct effect”.
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of direct effect, but rather it is a matter of recognizing decisions made by and through the WTO 
system. 
The WTO Dispute settlement system would gain both in terms of legitimacy and efficiency by 
the recognition of the invokability of panel and AB reports before the courts of the losing member 
ignoring the DSB’s ruling. This solution would provide an adequate incentive for Members to 
comply with their obligations under WTO rules, without depriving them of the discretion they enjoy 
in the implementation process. In fact, the invokability of these reports aiming at the recovery of 
damages would not prevent a losing Member from deciding whether to bring its measure into 
conformity or to have recourse to temporary measures, such as compensation or retaliation. It would 
rather protect private operators from a situation of possible denial of justice by giving at the same 
time teeth to the DSS.
While the US14 and Japan15 have both systematically ruled out the possibility for an individual 
to rely on WTO DSB’s reports, the European Community (EC)16, through its Luxembourg-based 
courts, has always showed more judicial openness and receptiveness for WTO law17. 
14 In the US “there is virtually no constitutional basis for individual challenges to trade policy measures … The general 
tendency of federal statutes in the trade policy area is to provide the executive with extremely broad discretion, leaving 
little room for judicial review”. See  Morrison & Hudec, supra note 5, at 132. 
15 In Japan, the attitude adopted by the courts toward GATT/WTO rules and decisions seems to be quite prudent. 
Although DSB’s rulings may be invoked in various situations: as “aids in interpreting Japanese domestic trade laws”, or 
“as evidence supportive of a conclusion reached through the interpretation of the laws”, they cannot be relied upon 
before courts. See, Yuji Iwasawa, Implementation of International Trade Agreements in Japan, in HILF & 
PETERSMANN, supra note 5, at 343; Bourgeois, supra note 6, at 115.
16 The words “European Economic Community” (EEC), “European Community” (EC) and European Union (EU) do 
not mean the same thing. The EEC was established in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome, but was then radically reformed by 
the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, thus becoming the EC. The Treaty of Maastricht also gave rise to a more ambitious 
supranational project: the EU, based on three “pillars”: the first pillar being the EC, the second and third respectively 
the EU Foreign and Security policy and the EU Home and Internal Affairs. Under the draft Constitutional Treaty, 
currently discussed by the Intergovernamental Conference (IGC), the EU’s pillar-based system is voted to disappear as 
a result of the merger of the Treaties in a unique text: the Constitutional Treaty of the EU. The only remaining entity 
would be the European Union.
17 Although the Council Decision 94/800 has clearly denied the direct applicability of WTO rules, that issue is by no 
means settled in the European legal order. Both legal scholars and the European Courts are currently engaged on a 
lively debate about the legal effects of WTO law in the in the internal legal order. Such a debate has been triggered by 
an increasing receptiveness to WTO law by the European Courts. Under their current case law, WTO Agreements could 
serve as a ground for review in cases where the Commuity intends to implement a particular WTO obligation (the 
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This paper will therefore mainly refer to the discourse developed within the EC upon the role of 
private individuals in the implementation of WTO dispute settlement decisions. The recent attempt 
made by a French meat trader to recover damages incurred as a result of the EC non-compliance 
with the Hormones decision18 is provided, throughout the paper, as an example of private parties’ 
involvement in the implementation phase19.
A possible opening by the European Court of Justice towards private parties’ involvement could 
strongly influence other relevant WTO implementation fora, such as the US and Japan. As private 
business operators may benefit from such a solution, regardless of their place of incorporation, the 
European debate over the issue seems to attract great interest in the business world. 
2. A brief overview over the DSS: who bears the costs of non-compliance?
Before turning to the issue of private parties’ involvement within the DSS, through the analysis 
of the Biret case in the broader context of the Hormones dispute, it is necessary to briefly describe 
how the dispute settlement works and, accordingly, which is its nature: conciliatory, diplomatic, 
political or legal?20
The DSU, governing the new dispute settlement system, provides specifically for a set of norms 
related to the implementation of Panel and Appellate Body decisions21. 
Nakajima doctrine: Case C-69/89, Nakajima All Precision Co.Ltd., v. Council, 1991 E.C.R. I-2069), or if  a Community 
act expressely refers to specific provisions of the WTO Agreements. (the Fediol doctrine: case C-70/87, Fediol v. 
Commision, 1989 E.C.R. 1781).
18 See supra note 12.
19 See Case T-174/00, Biret International v. Council, 2003 not yet published on E.C.R. and the appeal against this 
judgement, case C-93/02, Biret International v. Council, 2003 not yet published on E.C.R.
20 See Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, To settle or Empanel? An Empyrical Analysis of Litigation and 
Settlement at the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (2002) for an insightful (empyrical) analysis of the  
dynamics underpinning the DSS.
21 Articles 16.4 and 17.14 DSU.
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Before being adopted by the Dispute settlement body, Panel and AB reports do not have any 
direct binding effect on Members, but they are instead mere recommendations. Once a 
recommendation has been adopted by the DSB22, the losing party has primarily an obligation to 
bring the unlawful measure into conformity with WTO law23. At a DSB meeting scheduled within 
30 days after the date of adoption, the losing party has a duty to inform the DSB of its intentions in 
respect of implementation of the recommendations24. Article 21.1 underlines the importance of 
prompt compliance with recommendations and rulings of DSB “to ensure effective resolution of 
disputes to the benefit of all Members”.
Secondly, when it is “impracticable” to comply immediately, the Member has a “reasonable 
period in which to do so”25. This period of time may be either proposed by the Member, provided 
that it is approved by the DSB, or “mutually agreed” by the parties to the dispute within 45 days of 
the date of the adoption of the recommendation26. If the reasonable period of time for 
implementation is not determined in one of these two ways, provision is made for that period to be 
decided through binding arbitration within 90 days of adoption. However, such a limit period for 
implementation cannot exceed 15 months27. The determination of the duration of this period is 
relevant to the extent that, lacking an obligation to retroactively remedy any offending measure, the 
calculation of nullification and impairment commences from the expiry of the reasonable period 28.
Thirdly, the DSB has to keep under surveillance the implementation of the adopted 
recommendation29. Issues of implementation may be raised at the DSB by any Member at any time 
22 Adoption occurs according to a “reverse consensus” rule: adoption occurs automatically, unless the DSB (all 
Contracting States) decides by consensus to reject the report. Currently depending on whether or not an appeal is 
lodged, a case may take around 12-15 months before the adoption of the final report. See Article 20 DSU.
23 Article 19.1 DSU.
24 Article 21.3 DSU.
25 Article 21.3 DSU.
26 Id.
27 Article 21.3(c) DSU.
28 Except in the case of prohibited subsidies.
29 Article 21.6 DSU.
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following their adoption. Implementation is to remain on the DSB’s agenda until the issue is 
resolved. Article 21.5 establishes then a mechanism for dispute resolution (compliance panel) when 
there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken 
to comply to with recommendations and rulings. 
But what happens when the losing party fails to bring measures into conformity with the 
adopted report within a reasonable period of time? How should the courts deal with a persisting 
inconsistency of the domestic measure with WTO obligations?
Remedies within the WTO are prospective: they do not aim at punishing the offending member, 
but they rather tend to readjust trade relations so that the complainant will not suffer further losses. 
There are basically two “temporary” measures that a successful complainant may seek: it may ask 
either for compensation or for suspension of concessions (countermeasures)30. Both these 
instruments are temporary measures available exclusively in the event that the recommendations are 
not implemented within a reasonable period of time31. They operate according to the following 
scheme: a member failing to comply within the time limit “shall, if so requested” enter into 
negotiations with any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures, with a view to 
developing a mutually acceptable compensation. If those negotiations do not lead to an agreement 
between the parties, any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures may request 
authorization from the DSB to suspend the application of concessions or other obligations under the 
covered agreements32.  
A first problem that may arise in this situation is to determine the level of suspension. If the 
losing party objects to the proposed level of suspension, it may call for an arbitration proceeding 
30 Although the DSU refers to suspension of concessions, in the trade jargon this remedy is generally described as 
countermeasure or retaliation act.
31 Article 23 DSU.
32 Since 1995, the DSB has allowed retaliatory measures in several transatlantic cases, such as those on bananas, 
hormone-treated beef and Foreign Sales Corporations. See supra note 12. However, actual countermeasures have been 
adopted only in the Bananas and in the Hormones cases.
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aiming at establishing whether the level of suspension is legal and appropriate with reference the 
WTO violation. A second problem one may face with this “temporary” measure is then to 
determine in which sector the suspension of concessions should occur. Under the DSU, the 
preferred option is that retaliation should be in the same trade sector and under the same WTO 
agreement where the violation occurred33. However, if the complaining party considers that it is not 
practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to the same sector, 
cross-retaliation may be authorized in another trade sector or under another agreement that those 
where the WTO violation took place34. 
Who loses and who wins from the adoption of  “temporary” implementation measures?
While these two temporary measures have been designed to facilitate and foster compliance with 
the report, the beneficiaries are likely to be companies that have not been affected by the original 
WTO violation. Compensation35, consisting generally in charge reduction and applying on a 
multilateral most-favored-nation basis, favors all companies operating in the market and benefiting 
accordingly from the reduction. Countermeasures, although disfavoring consumers in the applicant 
country (who will pay higher prices for the targeted products), tend to protect the domestic and 
foreign providers of products competing with those targeted by the measure as they reduce 
considerably the level of competition in the market36. 
Who are then those affected by the adoption of these “temporary” implementation measures? 
We may distinguish between two categories of economic operators. First, private companies in the 
complaining Member whose exports continue to not receive the benefits that are normally entitled 
33 Article 22.3 (a) DSU.
34 Article 22.3 (b) (c) DSU.  
35 To our knowledge, parties to a dispute have only once agreed on compensation: US – Section 110(5) of the US 
Copyright Act, WT/DS160/ARB25/1.
36 For an analysis of the economic effectiveness of retaliation acts, see Robert Hudec, Broadening the scope of 
Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement, in FRIEDL WEISS, IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES 369, 
387 (Cameron & May, 2000) and Peter Van den Bossche, The Doha Development Round Negotiations on the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding, Institute for International Law, U.K. Leuven Faculty of Law, Working Paper N. 47,  
available at http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/iir/nl/wp/WP47e.pdf
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to and, secondly, those companies in the respondent countries that are affected by the retaliatory 
measures (retaliation and cross-retaliatory measures). Therefore the only remedy that all affected 
private parties would aim at is the withdrawal of WTO-inconsistent measures, as it would result in 
the resumption of exports37. 
In short, when a WTO Member ignores the ruling, private companies run the risk of not being 
protected by a system that on the one hand make them bear all the costs of non-compliance and, on 
the other, does not allow private parties to rely on the DSB’s decisions before any court.
3. A case study: the non-implementation of the Hormones rulings and private parties
To fully understand the (non) role played by private business operators in the DSB’s reports 
implementation process, we will turn to those companies that have been directly affected in their
business by the famous EC-Hormones dispute38. This case is probably the one that, by highlighting 
what may be perceived to be a limitation on the effectiveness of the current WTO dispute settlement 
system, best illustrates the tensions within the WTO system between private operators and WTO 
members39.
In this case both the panel and the Appellate Body found the European legislation, originating in 
the 1980s and restricting the imports of hormone-treated beef, in violation of the SPS Agreement40, 
37 As Allan Rosas noticed: “(suspension of concessions) restricts rather than promotes trade, while hurting companies 
which have nothing to do with the subject matter of the dispute, including companies of the complaining party”, 
Implementation and Enforcement of WTO Dispute Settlement Findings: An EU Perspective, J. INT’L ECONOMIC L., 131, 
143 (2001).
38 Panel Report, European Communities – Measures concerning meat and meat products (Hormones), 
WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997); Appellate Body Report, WT/DS26/AB/R.
39 See Daniel Wuger, The Never Ending Story: The Implementation Phase in the Dispute between the EC and the US on 
Hormone-treated Beef, LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS., at 777, for a detailed reconstruction and insightful analysis of the 
dispute.
40 Annex 1A to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
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essentially on the ground that it was not based on a complete risk assessment analysis of the cancer 
risks associated with the use of certain hormones as growth hormones41. Because the EC failed to 
meet the deadline to comply with the report, the complaining parties (US and Canada) were 
authorized by the DSB to impose retaliatory measures in the form of punitive tariffs on certain 
products exported into their respective territories by the EC42. The EC, maintaining its ban until 
today, is currently facing heavy retaliatory action. European exporters of luxury products - ranging 
from French cheese producers to Italian handbag manufacturers43 - are those most affected by the 
economic sanctions.
Although this measure was meant to restore the balance of concessions established between the 
parties during the Uruguay Round, it raised substantially the trade barriers between the two 
countries by damaging not exclusively those companies who do not receive the benefits that are 
normally entitled to under the WTO Agreement (essentially the hormone-treated beef importers), 
but also those private companies exporting from the EC into the US that have nothing to do with the 
original complaint (mainly luxury goods producers)44. In addition, it must also be noted that, some 
months after the USTR increased tariffs, the US Congress enacted Section 407 of the Trade and 
Development Act of 2000 (the “Carousel Legislation Act”) allowing the US trade authorities to 
rotate the products contained in the retaliation list when a country does not comply with the DSB 
41 More precisely, the WTO Appellate Body reversed most of the findings of the panel. The WTO Appellate Body only 
upheld the finding that prohibition of imports of meat from hormone-treated animals to the EU did not comply with the 
requirement that such a measure should be based on a relevant assessment of the risks to human health. 
42 The World Trade Organization had allowed the US, which used to ship $500 million of beef to the European Union 
annually,  to impose punitive tariffs on EU goods worth $117m (€101m) a year in 1999. Canada has been authorized to 
retaliate for the amount of 11 million US dollars.
43 The sanctions targeted several European delicacies such as Roquefort cheese, Danish ham, German chocolate and 
French mustard.
44 Having the US beef industry been severely damaged by the EC ban, it has been proposed to allocate the income 
obtained from the application of the retaliatory measures to these companies through the establishment of a Beef 
Industry Compensation Trust Fund. See Trade Industry Compensation Act of 2000, S. 2709, 106th Cong. § 2(7) (2000). 
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ruling45. The legislation attempts to put pressure on the foreign governments, through their domestic 
exporters, to bring their measures into conformity with the WTO Agreements46. It follows that a 
growing number of economic operators have been heavily affected by the EC non-compliance with 
the WTO final ruling.
Lastly, the EC has issued a new Hormones directive that has in essence upheld the WTO-illegal 
restrictions to the imports of hormones47. Although the EC claims that this legislation is now WTO-
compatible - being based on new scientific evidence -, the US has already voiced its opposition to 
this new text by arguing that it would still be contrary to WTO law48. It is therefore highly probable 
that the question could go back to the WTO in the next months49.
Meanwhile, a growing number of companies are heavily affected by the EC non-compliance 
with the report. 
4. The Biret case or “how to take WTO law seriously” within the EC legal order
45 US Pub. Law 106-200, 18 May 2000, 114 Stat. 251, Sect. 2. The EC immediately requested consultations under 
Article 4 of the DSU arguing the “Carousel legislation” was against the DSU as it allowed unilateral suspension of 
concessions that had not been authorized by the DSB. However, after an agreement was reached in the Bananas case, 
the EC did not go further in the proceedings thus leaving the issue of the legality of this measure still open.
46 On the "Carousel legislation”, see Alberto Alemanno & Carine Moquart, La loi carousel: dernier développement du 
conflit entre Etats-Unis et l’Unione européenne, LETTRE DU DROIT DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL 3 (2000).
47 Directive 2003/74/EC implementing the WTO ruling, entered into force on 14 October 2003. EU Member States 
must implement it within 12 months of its entry into force.
48 See, Press Release of the EU Commission, 15 October 2003, EU complies with WTO ruling on Hormone beef,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/respectrules/dispute/pr151003_en.htm
49 On the possible outcomes of the Hormones dispute, see Daniel Wger, supra note 38, at 17. The European 
Communities asked Canada and the US on December 1, 2003 to initiate a compliance procedure to assess the WTO 
consistency of the EC's new measure in the hormone-treated beef case but Canada and the US said that they would 
rather hold further discussions. See, WTO DSB press release, at http://www.wto.org/english /news_e/news03_e/ 
dsb_1dec03_e.htm
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The Biret judgment represents one of the most representative cases showing the tensions 
currently existing within the DSS’s implementation process between Members and its business 
economic operators50. 
4.1 Facts and the CFI’s judgment
In June 2000, Biret International, a French trader of meat, filed an action before the Court of 
first instance (CFI) seeking compensation for the damage which it claimed to have suffered as a 
result of the adoption and maintenance in force of the European ban on the import into the 
Community of meat and meat products from cattle treated with certain hormones.
The plaintiff, relying on the WTO Hormones decision condemning this ban as violating WTO 
law, asked the Court to hold the EC liable for the non-implementation of the report under Article 
228 of the EC Treaty (ex Article 215)51. 
Biret based his action on two arguments. First, it contended that since 1 January 1995 (date of 
entry into force of the WTO Agreements) the European hormones regime has conflicted with the 
WTO agreements, particularly with the SPS. Secondly, it stated that this case would fall outside the 
scope of the classic case law denying direct effect to the WTO Agreements as the violation was 
“subject of express criticism on the part of the DSB” and  was “permanent” since “the EC has 
expressed its intention to maintain the embargo despite the current state of scientific research”52. In 
50 Although not issue of first impression, the ECJ and the CFI have been confronted only twice with individual’s actions 
based on DSB’s reports pronounced against the EC. In both cases, the applicants relied on the WTO Appellate Body 
Report in the Bananas case. See supra note 30. In the first case, the ECJ dismissed the claim on procedural grounds 
(Case C-104/97 P, Atlanta AG v. European Union, [199] ECR I-6983), and in the second the CFI rejected the claim as 
unfounded relying on the fact that in the meanwhile the EC amended its regulation bringing it into compliance with the 
DSB’s report (Case T-254/97, Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH Chemnitz v. Commission [1999] ECR II- 2743). 
51 According to EC’s settled case law, in order for the EC to be held “non-contractually” liable, a number of conditions 
have to be met: a) the conduct of the EC institutions must be unlawful; b) there must be a real and certain damage c) 
there must be a casual link between the conduct of the institution concerned and the alleged damage. In the present 
claim, the central question is to determine whether the EC’s attitude vis-à-vis the Hormones decision satisfies, in the 
light of the ECJ’s case law, the unlawfulness requirement. 
52 Supra note 19.
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other terms, the plaintiff asked the Court to examine the issue of invokability of DSB’s reports 
irrespective of the direct applicability of the WTO Agreements.
However, the Court of first instance dismissed the action for damage by referring to the “firmly 
established case-law” denying the right of individuals to rely on WTO rules before the European 
Courts53. It then added that the “decision of the DSB of 13 February 1998 […] cannot alter” this 
conclusion. 
According to the Court,
“There is an escapable and direct link between the decision and the plea alleging the infringement 
of the SPS Agreement, and the decision could therefore only be taken into consideration if the Court 
had found that Agreement to have direct effect in the context of a plea alleging the invalidity of the 
directives in question”54. 
Although suggested by the applicant to examine the two issues separately, the Court, in line 
with its traditional case law, treated the invokability issue as strictly related to the question of direct 
effect of WTO rules. It then emphasized ad colorandum that 
“the purpose of the WTO Agreements is to govern relations between States or regional organizations 
for economic integration and not to protect individuals”55.
53 Id., ¶ 61.
54 Id. ¶ 67.
55 Id. ¶ 62.
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4.2 The Advocate General’s opinion
Biret introduced an appeal against the CFI’s judgment, thus giving the Advocate General (AG) 
the opportunity to deliver an opinion on the matter56. Surprisingly, the Advocate General Alber 
sided with the applicant, by advising the ECJ to recognize the possibility of individuals to invoke 
DSB’s reports and, accordingly, to hold the EC liable for failure to implement the Hormones ruling. 
How did the AG come to this “revolutionary” conclusion?57
The AG started his opinion by analyzing in great detail the Dispute Settlement Dispute’s 
mechanisms. Relying on Art. 22 of the DSU, the AG took the position that WTO Members do not 
have other (legal) choice than to comply with the adopted reports58. The recognition of a “direct 
effect” to a Panel and/or Appellate Body’s ruling – he proceeded - would not reduce the margin of 
discretion that WTO Members enjoy in the implementation process, as there is no room for further 
negotiations59. 
Moreover, even if the implementation of DSB’s rulings and recommendations requires the 
adoption of a legislative act, the European Community has not adopted during the last four years 
any acts following the expiration of the reasonable period of time accorded to comply with the 
decision. Against this backdrop, the AG wondered whether Biret should face this situation without 
56 The task of the Advocate General is to propose to the Court, in complete independence, a legal solution to the case in 
question. Its Opinion does not bind the Court of Justice. See, Opinion of Advocate General Sigbert Alber in case C-
93/02, Biret International v. Council, delivered on 15 May 2003, not yet published on E.C.R.
57 Geert Zonnekeyn, EC Liability for the Non-Implementation of WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions – Advocate 
General Alber Proposes a “Copernican Innovation” in the case law of the ECJ, J.INT’L ECONOMIC L. 6(3), 761-769 
(2003).
58 Supra note 53, ¶ 86.
59 Id., ¶ 95.
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any possibility of recovery or should it rather be entitled to invoke the Hormones decision 
establishing the WTO illegality of the ban60.
The AG embraced the latter conclusion relying on the existence of a fundamental right of free 
trade within the EC legal order. According to Alber, it would not only be unfair to refuse to 
compensate the damages suffered by an individual as a result of the non-compliance - lasting for 
more than four years - with a DSB’s report, but it would also amount to a fundamental right’s 
violation61. In addition, he argued that the recognition of the right of individuals to invoke WTO’s 
reports before the courts does not imply per se an individual’s right to compliance. Private operators 
would not be able to oblige the European Community to implement the decision in a particular way, 
but they would simply be allowed to claim damages suffered as a result of the non-compliance. In 
other terms, the AG made a claim in favor of the invokability of DSB’s reports by arguing that this  
would not reduce the margin of discretion that EC authorities enjoy in ensuring the implementation 
of the WTO’s rulings. 
Finally, the AG clearly stated that where a DSB’s report establishes a WTO violation and the 
EC has not complied with the report, within a reasonable period of time, WTO law is “directly 
applicable”62. In other words, the AG clearly addresses a message to the EC legislator: the WTO 
law has to be taken seriously!
4.3. The ECJ’s judgment
60 Id., ¶ 90.
61 Id., ¶ 92.
62 Id., ¶ 114.
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As announced by some commentators, it was quite unlikely that the Court would have adhered 
to the AG’s position63. Therefore the judgment caused no surprise when it rejected the appeal in its 
entirety64.
However, a careful reading of its text shows the will of the Court to bring its classic case law a 
bit further towards the recognition of some role for individuals in the implementation phase of 
DSB’s reports.
The ECJ first criticized the CFI for having reduced the issue of invokability of the DSB’s report 
to the one of direct effect of WTO rules stating that 
“…such reasoning does not suffice […] to deal with the plea put forward by the applicant at first 
instance concerning infringement of the SPS Agreement”65. 
The Court also faulted the CFI for not having considered the EC ban in the light of the 
Hormones ruling since DSB’s reports provide grounds for a review by the Community Courts of the 
legality of EC law66.
However, the ECJ, after showing such an unexpected opening towards a possible control upon 
EC rules under the DSB’s findings, ultimately rejected the action since Biret did not suffer any 
damages after the expiration of the reasonable period of time to comply with the report. Biret went 
out of business in 1995, while the 15 month-period within which to implement the report elapsed 
only in May 1999. According to the Court, recognizing a right to recover damages suffered before 
63 Zonnekeyn, supra note 55; at 769.
64 Among the first reviews to this judgment, see Alberto Alemanno, Droit de l’OMC, “Biret International”, 3 REVUE 
DU DROIT DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE, (2003); Werner Berg, ECJ Opens Door to Direct Applicability of WTO Rules in EC 
Law--a Little, 12 GERMAN AMERICAN LAW JOURNAL 2003, at http://www.amrecht.com/berg1.shtml.
65 See supra note 19, ¶ 56.
66 Id., ¶ 57.
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the end of this deadline would render ineffective the grant of a reasonable period of time for 
compliance with the DSB’s report67.
On the basis of these arguments, the Court has rejected the appeal in its entirety. However, in 
the same judgment, the Court seems to leave open the possibility that individuals may rely on 
DSB’s reports to recover those damages encountered after the expiration of the reasonable period of 
time within which the EC is supposed to comply.
4. Some reflections on private parties’ role in the WTO’s report implementation
Since WTO Agreements fail to supply a satisfactory answer to the question of private parties’ 
involvement in the implementation of DSB’s decision, the issue finally boils down to an 
interpretative question. Lacking a concrete answer to that question into the WTO Agreements, most 
WTO members’ courts have taken a very careful position with respect to this issue. As for the 
panels and the AB, they have discussed about the status of their reports only in one occasion by 
stating in an obiter dictum that 
“Whether there are circumstances where obligations in any of the WTO agreements addressed to 
Members would create rights for individuals which national courts must protect, remains an open 
question, in particular in respect of obligations following the exhaustion of DSU procedures in a 
specific dispute”68.
67 Id., ¶ 62.
68 Panel Report, United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R, (Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter 
Section 301 Panel Report], ¶ 7.72.
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To our knowledge, neither national nor regional courts have ever taken into consideration the 
DSB decisions in their judgments, by recognizing a right to damage to private parties.
Against this backdrop, I turn now to examine the underlying arguments developed both in the 
literature and in the case law against the recognition the invokability of DSB’s reports.
The analysis will illustrate how most of the legal policy considerations that run against such a 
recognition may be counterbalanced by other arguments in favor of this result.
 5.1 The arguments pro and con “invokability” of DSB’s reports
Which are the main obstacles to the recognition of a right of individuals to rely on DSB’s 
report?
Most of the arguments that have been developed in both the literature and in court against the 
enforceability of DSB’s reports by private parties are strictly interrelated to the issue of direct effect 
of WTO rules. There is a clear tendency to reduce these two issues to a unique problem.
5.1.1 The contra
The invokability of DBS’s reports has generally been denied on the following grounds.
a) Direct effect of WTO rules would serve as a pre-condition for the invokability of reports
According to this argument, lacking WTO rules of direct effect, it would be impossible to recognize 
a right of individuals to invoke DSB’s reports as this would lead to granting a de facto direct affect 
to these rules. In other words, recognizing the invokability of the reports would circumvent the 
well-established lack of direct effect of WTO rules69. 
69 It is mainly relying on this argument that the ECJ has thus far refused to hold the EC liable for its persisting non-
compliance with WTO decisions. See, for instance Case C-104/97 P, Atlanta, [1999] E.C.R. I-6983, ¶ 20. The same 
argument has also been developed in Japan, see Iwasawa, supra note 15, at 337.
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As underlined above, this argument leads to a situation in which the absence of direct effect 
protects the WTO Member who ignores a DSB’s reports, thus shifting the costs of non-compliance 
from the losing Member to the affected private parties.
I do not find this argument persuasive as I conceive the issue of direct effect of WTO rules as 
conceptually different from the one of invokability of DSB’s reports 70. In the former situation, 
parties would rely on WTO rules before courts by alleging a violation, whereas in the latter a 
violation would already have been established. Moreover, it has to be noticed that granting a right 
of individual to invoke DSB’s reports before courts does not amount to the recognition of direct 
effect to WTO rules as Members would still be free to decide whether or not to comply with the 
report. In other words, private parties would not be able to oblige the WTO losing Member to 
implement the decision in a particular way. They would be exclusively allowed to rely on a WTO 
ruling to seek for damages arisen subsequently to the period within which the losing Member 
should have complied with the report.
In the Biret case, the ECJ would seem to have easily overcome this argument: it looks prepared 
to consider itself bound by an adopted report irrespective of the direct applicability of the WTO 
Agreements. Support for this view can be found in one of its landmark judgment, Francovich, in 
which it has been established that the lack of direct effect does not necessarily exclude liability 
under EC law71. It follows that “invokability” and direct effect are two self-contained concepts. 
Finally, this argument can be easily reversed by claiming that it is the very fact of lacking of 
direct effect that justifies the recognition of a right of individuals to rely on WTO decisions. Since 
70 In the same line of thought, see Cottier, supra note 13, at 126 (“this matter is entirely different from the issue of direct 
effect”) and Thomas Cottier & Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, The relationship between the world trade Organization 
Law, National and Regional Law, 1 J. INT’L ECONOMIC L. 83, 84 (1998) (“This is an issue which legally speaking is 
separate from direct effect in the traditional sense”).
71 Case C-479/93, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1995 E.C.R. I-3843.
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WTO rules lack direct effect, the DSB’s reports should be enforceable before national courts in 
order to provide individuals with some judicial protection of the rights they derive from the WTO. 
b) Reliance on the reports would upset reciprocity and the balance of power with major 
trading partners that deny such an effect ("balance-of-concessions argument")
This is the “paramount policy argument”72 developed to refuse direct effect to WTO rules and, 
accordingly, any other policy increasing receptiveness for WTO law. According to this view, 
originally developed under the GATT system, the WTO has to be seen as a framework of balanced 
trade concessions that have been negotiated during several multilateral negotiation rounds. In this 
framework, should a WTO Member recognize direct effect, or the mere invokability of the DSB’s 
rulings before its courts, this would upset the balance of mutual rights and obligations of that State 
and the other WTO Members. It follows that as long as any trade power such as the EC or the US 
do not allow private parties to rely on WTO rules, or on its DSB’s rulings, before its courts, most of 
the WTO Members will deny direct effect or any other form of invokability of these rules. 
From a political point of view, a stricter enforcement of WTO rules is seen as potentially 
detrimental to WTO Member’s interests. 
The current situation has been effectively described as a deadlock in which “Everybody expects 
someone else to make a move with the result that nobody moves”73. 
Arguably the reciprocity principle is relevant not only to deny direct effect of WTO rules, but 
also to rule out a possible reliance on WTO’s decisions before courts. Should the ECJ recognize the 
EC liable for non-implementing the Hormones decision, that would put the Community under 
72 Piet Eeckhout, The domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems, 34 COMMOM MKT 
L. REV. 11, 48 (1997). 
73 J. Bourgeois, supra note 6, at 116; this situation has also been described as an “impasse in academia and practice” by 
Cottier & Schefer, supra note 67, at 84.
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pressure to bring its measures into conformity. On the contrary, if the US continues to persist in 
non-complying, for instance, with the recent steel decision74, it would not be subjected to the same 
kind of pressure. Henceforth, the EC increased receptiveness to WTO law would upset the 
reciprocity principle.
c) DSB’s reports would not be binding, but simply one of the implementation options 
available to the losing member
According to this argument, the legal status of these reports when adopted is strictly related to the 
question of the nature of legal obligations deriving from the membership to the WTO and its DSS. 
As the DSU gives WTO Members the possibility of maintaining the unlawful measures in place 
beyond the reasonable period of time by allowing compensation or suspension of concessions, it 
might be argued that full implementation with the DSB’s reports would not be an absolute 
obligation75. Hence the question that arises is: are DSB’s reports binding upon the parties? 
Professor Jackson76, one of the most prominent voices in the International Trade arena, has 
convincingly argued that compensation and suspension of concessions, being temporary measures 
available exclusively in the event that recommendations are not implemented within a reasonable 
period of time, do not constitute an exception to complying with WTO obligations77. By examining 
74 Report of the Appellate Body, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, 
WT/DS248/AB/R; WT/DS249/AB/R; WT/DS251/AB/R; WT/DS252/AB/R; WT/DS253/AB/R; WT/DS254/AB/R; 
WT/DS258/AB/R; WT/DS259/AB/R.
75 The most persuasive formulation of this thesis has been developed by Judith Hipler Bello, The WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding: Less is More, 90 A.. J. INT’L L. 416 (1996) who wrote: "[t]he only truly binding WTO 
obligation is to maintain the balance of concessions negotiated among members”. According to this Author, the WTO 
system has to be seen as a framework of balanced trade concessions that have been negotiated during several 
multilateral negotiation rounds, rather than as a strictly rule-oriented judicial system. In the same line of thought, see 
also T.M. Reiff – M. Forestal, Revenge of the Push-Me, Pull-You: the Implementation Process Under the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding, 32 INT’L LAW 755, 763 (1998).
76 John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding–Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation, 
91 A. J. INT’L L.  60, 63 (1997).
77 The question whether a Panel and Appellate Body reports, once adopted by the DSB, are binding upon WTO 
Members has been the object of a significant debate during the last decade. There seems to be a consensus among 
scholars that DSB rulings, once the reasonable period has expired, constitute international legal obligations. Parties do 
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the DSU articles governing the implementation process, he concluded that the DSU “clearly 
establishes a preference for an obligation to perform the recommendation”78. Indeed, the obligation 
to comply with the report may be inferred from the language of the DSU itself79. 
Therefore, even when it is not implemented by the responsible Member, a DSB ruling is legally 
binding.
I believe it would be inconsistent with the legalistic nature of the new DSS to interpret its text 
by recognizing a complete freedom whether to comply with DSB’s decisions. More realistically, 
compensation is a “practical option to temporarily defuse a dispute between WTO Members who 
are parties to a dispute”80. This conclusion is confirmed by Article 17, paragraphe 14, that reads 
“An Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties 
to the dispute (…)”. Finally, the DSU’s rules on compensation and retaliation should not act as a 
barrier to acknowledging that WTO dispute settlement decisions are binding on the WTO 
Members’ judiciary and, accordingly, may be relied upon by individuals before courts81.
d) The invokability would reduce the margin of discretion that WTO members enjoy in the 
implementation
not have other choice than to comply with the DSB’s rulings. For an overview over this debate, see JEFF WAINCYMER, 
WTO LITIGATION, PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF FORMAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 659-664 (Cameron May ed., 2002). See 
also Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go? 95 A. J. INT’L L. 535, 
538 (2001). For a recent contribution, see Nathalie McNelis, What Obligations Are Created by World Trade 
Organization Dispute Settlement Reports?, J. WORLD TRADE 647, 672 (2003).
78 Jackson, supra note 74.
79 Art. 22.1 of the DSU provides that “…neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations is 
preferred to full implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered agreements 
…”.
80 Geert A. Zonnekeyn, The Status of Adopted Panel and AB Reports in the European Court of Justice and the 
European Court of First Instance, 34(3) J. WORLD TRADE 93, 103 (2000).
81 In the same line of thought, see Eeckhout, supra note 69, at 55.
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Another argument generally put forward to deny the invokability of DSB’s reports is based on the 
claim that holding a WTO Member liable for non-compliance would remove the legal room of 
maneuver that WTO Members enjoy in the reports’ implementation.
A losing WTO Member held liable on that ground, being forced by individuals to implement the 
report as soon as possible, would lose its discretion in deciding whether or not to comply with the 
decision. 
However, it should be noticed that WTO Members’ liability does not reduce per se the ability of 
the State to decide whether to comply, as it does not entitle the individual to oblige the WTO 
Member to abide by the report. Therefore, although held liable for non-implementation, the losing 
Member would still be free to decide whether and how to implement the report.
In other words, it is not argued here that courts should suspend the application of domestic law 
contrary to the decision, as this would admittedly amount to reducing the discretion Members enjoy 
in complying with WTO obligations. Rather this paper suggests that individuals should be granted a 
right to recover the damages suffered as a direct result of persistent and arbitrary non-compliance 
with DSB’s reports82. 
In short, the invokability of these reports would not prevent a losing Member from deciding 
whether to bring its measure into conformity or to have recourse to temporary measures, such as 
compensation or retaliation. It would rather protect private operators from a situation of possible 
denial of justice while giving teeth to the DSS.
Finally, it seems that the reasons for not granting direct effect cannot convincingly be extended 
to deny the invokability of the reports. In other words, the reasons for not granting direct effect –
82 Thomas Cottier took this view arguing that in cases where WTO rulings are simply ignored, courts, both of the EC 
and of its Member states, should no longer apply those measures found inconsistent with the reports. See Cottier, supra
note 6, at 374.
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whether it is the agreement’s flexibility, the “balance of powers” argument, or the lack of direct 
effect of WTO rules – “cease to be valid where a violation is established”83.
5.1.2 The pro
After having showed as most of the legal policy arguments do not seem really persuasive in denying 
the possibility of individuals to invoke the settlement dispute reports, we turn to examine some of 
the arguments in favor of this solution, by presenting some of the advantages that could be attained 
through more judicial openness and receptiveness for WTO law in national and regional courts.
a) Individuals as the main beneficiaries of the multilateral trade system
Although the WTO is essentially an international organization in which private individuals do not 
play any role, they are the main beneficiaries of the whole trading system. 
A growing number of WTO provisions – such as those concerning public procurement, intellectual 
property rights or food safety – have an immediate impact not only on legal relations between the 
WTO Members and their citizens but also between individuals themselves.
This is probably the most appealing legal policy argument that can be made to support the 
granting of a right of individuals to invoke before national and regional courts the adopted 
decisions.
As the Panel in Section 301 case has stated:
“…it would be entirely wrong to consider that the position of individuals is of no relevance to the 
GATT/WTO legal matrix’. Many of the benefits to Members which are meant to flow as a result of 
the acceptance of various discipline under the GATT/WTO depend on the activity of individual 
83 Eeckhout, supra note 69, at 53.
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economic operators in the national and global market places. The purpose of these disciplines, indeed 
one of the GATT/WTO as a whole, is to produce certain market conditions which would allow this 
individual activity to flourish”84.
“The multilateral trading system is, per force, composed not only of States but also, indeed mostly, of 
individual economic operators. The lack of security and predictability affects mostly these individual 
operators”.
“Trade is conducted most often and increasingly by private operators. It is through improved 
conditions for these private operators that Members benefit from WTO disciplines…”85. 
Moreover, this argument finds a strong support and might be strengthened by the theory 
developed by some Authors according to which GATT/WTO rules would lay down fundamental 
rights of freedom of trade, aimed at restricting the power of governments to regulate their economic 
activities 86. If the WTO Agreements provide individuals with fundamental rights, its Members 
should recognize not only the invokability of the reports, but also the direct effect of WTO rules or 
at least of some of them, in order to ensure the protection of these rights through enforcement 
mechanisms. Whenever these free trade rights – the argument proceeds - should be considered also 
as fundamental, the absence of justiciability would constitute a dangerous hole in the legal system.
In this line of thought, one may conclude by stating that, by having a fundamental economic 
right to be compensated, private business operators must be able to invoke the non-implementation 
of these reports as a basis for liability of the WTO losing Member. 
b) Denial of justice and legitimate expectations
84 See supra note 67, ¶ 7.73.
85 See supra note 67, ¶ 7.76.
86 See in particular the writings by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, National Constitutions and International Economic Law, 
in Hilf & Petersmann, supra note 5, at 3-52; contra, Steve Peers, Fundamental right or Political Whim? WTO Law and 
the European Court of Justice, in DE BURCA & SCOTT, supra note 6, 111, at 130.
28
This paper has already described the situation of denial of justice that it might arise from the 
deliberate WTO Member’s decision to not comply with a report. As we have seen, the DSU, by 
providing alternative, although temporary, measures to implement the WTO decisions, such as 
compensation and retaliation, makes individuals bear the cost of non-compliance without allowing 
them to rely on WTO’s reports before national courts. 
When a losing Member does not comply with a DSB’s report, it is presumably aware of its 
unlawfulness and of the possibility of harm inflicted to some private parties. However, under the 
current DSU regime, private parties affected by the persisting non-implementation with the report 
are not entitled to invoke the WTO decision before any courts. Conversely, the lack of invokability 
of the reports is judicially protected by the DSS.
What about all those companies affected by either the persistent WTO violation or by the 
retaliatory measures?
It would be unfair to deny to private parties the right to claim for damages in a situation in 
which the losing Member’s inaction would negatively impact on its business. It has also be argued 
that non-compliance with a DSB’s report may amount to a weakening of protection of legitimate 
expectations87.
From an EC perspective, this situation is even less tolerable to the extent that the Community 
Legal order considers not only the Member States as subjects but also the individual. Therefore I 
believe that the absence of protection of individual rights currently existing within the DSS calls for 
the recognition by the European Courts of the invokability of the DSB’s reports as the only possible 
way to give the individuals the right to seek for damages suffered as a result of the EC’s non-
compliance.
87 Cottier & Scheffer, supra note 67, at 85.
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c) Incentive to comply with DSB’s reports: toward full compliance?
Holding a WTO losing Member liable for non-compliance with DSB’s reports would contribute to 
the health of the WTO dispute resolution, by providing an adequate incentive for Members to 
comply with their obligations under WTO rules, while yet at the same time depriving them of the 
discretion they enjoy in the implementation process.
Although the final goal of the DSS is not to assure full compliance with the DSB’s reports88, 
but simply to achieve between the parties a mutual acceptable solution, “policies of simply ignoring 
the rulings by blocking their adoption are no longer available”89. From a legal perspective, a DSB’s 
report is a “legally binding order”90 addressed to a WTO Member, whose adoption cannot be 
blocked any longer by the losing Member. Equally, from a political perspective, ignoring adopted 
recommendations is not possible without carrying high political costs because of the increasing 
pressure from both outside (other governments) and inside (affected private parties) the country.   
Last, but not least, non-compliance, being negatively perceived by the public opinion, may damage 
the reputation of the losing country that may find itself under the public spotlight. Hence, non-
compliance, causing problems abroad and at home, is increasingly feared by WTO Members.
Henceforth, the threat of being condemned to pay damages arisen subsequently to the period 
within which the WTO Member should have implemented the report may constitute a great 
incentive to comply, by reinforcing the judicial nature of the DSS. 
Finally, the perspective of being obliged to pay damages associated with the threat of 
retaliatory measures may considerably enhance the incentives to abide by the WTO settlement 
88 See Carlos M. Vazquez & John Jackson, Some reflections on Compliance With WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions, 
33 LAW & POL’Y INTL BUS. 555, 565 (2002) explain that “members were unwilling to pay the collateral costs in terms 
of sovereignty for a regime that would achieve [full] compliance”.
89 Cottier, supra note 6, at 364.
90 Hudec, supra note 33, at 377.
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disputes’ decisions. While the total costs of non-compliance would inevitably increase, their burden 
would partly shift from the economic operators to the losing Member.
d) More fair balance between the conflicting interests of the WTO actors
This argument holds that reliance on DSB’s reports would provide a valuable solution to the need of 
striking a more fair balance between the interests of the WTO actors: its Members and their private 
business operators. 
The invokability of DSB’s reports could improve the relationship that private operators have 
with the multilateral trading system without subverting its flexible diplomatic nature.
e) Major changes in the lives of international trade lawyers 
The recognition of some legal effects deriving from the non-implementation of these decisions 
could also bring about major changes in the lives of international trade lawyers, by injecting new 
energy within a law practice which is closer to a consultancy activity that to a litigation one91. As a 
result of the acceptance of the invokability of the DSB’s reports, practicing lawyers will more often 
rely on WTO rules thus making the system more predictable for all WTO actors, resulting in an 
increased confidence within the DSS among private parties.
These arguments seem to justify, at least in principle, the acknowledgement of the invokability 
of DSB’s reports before the courts of the WTO losing Member. Indeed, it is partly relying on these 
arguments, originally developed by the AG, that the ECJ has admitted to consider itself bound by 
the DSB’s reports irrespective of the direct applicability of the WTO Agreement.
91 For an interesting presentation of the role of lawyers in the current WTO Dispute Settlement, see The function of 




While WTO Members are aware of the importance to protect also private individuals - also as 
far as the DSS is concerned - they also pursue other equally important interests that may not 
necessarily coincide with those of private operators. This is the reason that explains why the WTO, 
notably its DSS, has been conceived as a flexible system that allows parties to deviate from the 
rules whenever they think it is necessary. However, there is an increasing pressure for more direct 
involvement of private parties in the WTO dispute settlement92. 
This paper, after assuming that arbitrary non-compliance should not be judicially protected by 
the DSS, tries to develop a solution capable of addressing private parties’ interests within the DSS’s 
implementation process. 
Since private parties are those most affected by the inefficiencies of the DSS, it is important to 
find a way to somehow accommodate their interests within the system without subverting the 
DSS’s main objective, which is to promote mutual acceptable solutions between Members. 
The analysis ventures to suggest that allowing individuals to seek compensation of damages 
deriving from non-compliance by the losing Member may be a valuable solution to strike a more 
fair balance between the interests of the WTO actors: its Members and their private business 
operators. Thus, the invokability of DSB’s reports could improve the relationship that private 
operators have with the multilateral trading system without modifying its flexible nature.
It is not argued here that WTO Members’ courts should suspend the application of domestic law 
contrary to the decision, as this would amount to a restriction of the discretion Members enjoy in 
92 Apart from the numerous claims made in the literature for granting individuals access to the WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings, the debate ranging over whether private parties should be allowed to submit their amicus curiae briefs 
before the panels and AB clearly shows the existence of this trend. See supra note 11.
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complying with WTO obligations, but it has been simply suggested that it should be granted a right 
of individuals to recover the damages suffered as a direct result of persistent and arbitrary non-
compliance with DSB’s reports. The recent Biret judgment by the ECJ seems to prove that such an 
approach, at least within the EC, may reasonably encounter the favor of the Courts, even those of 
large trading powers93.  Should the courts of one WTO Member open their doors to private parties’ 
claims relying on DSB’s reports, this solution would probably reverberate beyond its borders. This 
opening could positively impact the whole WTO DSS’s proceedings by giving incentives to the 
losing Member to comply with DSB’s rulings. Regardless of their origin, all economic operators 
affected by the non-compliance with a DSB’s decision should be entitled to seek compensation 
before the Courts of the losing Member who consciously and persistently chooses not to give effect 
to the WTO ruling. As a result, both the private parties directly affected by the WTO violation and 
those affected by the sanctions imposed as a result of the non-compliance, would be allowed to 
claim damages before the Courts of the losing WTO Member. As showed above, this could happen 
without subverting the “complex package deal” represented by the WTO94, nor its “principle of 
equilibrium”95. Indeed, this solution would not reduce the margin of discretion Members enjoy in 
the implementation process nor it would force them to comply with the reports.
However, it remains open the question to see how this result may be attained within the current 
WTO institutional framework.  This solution may be either left to each WTO Member, who may act 
domestically, or it may be agreed multilaterally at international level. In view of the progressively 
judicialization of the DSS, I am personally in favor of the possibility of seeking multilaterally 
93 On the issue of unilateral implementation of decisions of the DSB in specific and adjudicated cases by “large trading 
powers”, see Cottier & Scheffer, supra note 67, at 117.
94 Snyder, supra note 6, at 365.
95 Miquel Montana I Mora, Equilibrium: A rediscovered basis for the Court of Justice of the European Communities to 
refuse direct effect of the Uruguay Round Agreements?, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 43, 59 (1996).
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agreed rules regarding the internal effect of DSB’s reports in future negotiations96. The rule-
oriented nature of the current dispute settlement would justify the introduction of some enforcement 
remedies capable of strengthening its implementation process. The introduction of a WTO Member 
liability for non-implementation of a ruling would be likely to improve the overall effectiveness of 
the DSS by moving the system closer to the objective of full compliance97. 
Finally, if it is true that the main weakness of the DSS - currently under scrutiny - lies in the fact 
that it does not provide incentives for Members to comply with their WTO obligations, I believe the 
invokability of DSB’s reports before the WTO losing Member’s courts could pave the way to 
achieving the goal of full compliance. The high levels of legitimacy reached by the Panel and AB’s 
reports among WTO Members could not but facilitate that process.
96 Negotiations on the reform of the WTO Dispute Settlement System are currently under way and they do not have led 
yet to an amendment of the DSU. See e.g. Nikolaos Lavranos, Some Proposals for a Fundamental DSU Reform, 29 
LEGAL ISSUES EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 73 (2002).
97 JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 113 
(The MIT Press: Cambridge, 1997) refers to the same idea by using the different expression “rule of integrity”.
